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FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION AND CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM: MISCASTING THE PROBLEM, 
RECASTING THE SOLUTION 
DEBORAH L. RHODE† 
INTRODUCTION 
When most Americans think about access to law, their primary 
impression is that the country has too much, not too little. Part of the 
reason for this perception is the media’s delight in profiling loony 
litigation. America faces no shortage in supply of cases that seem too 
big for courts, cases that seem too small, and cases that should never 
have been cases at all. At one end of the spectrum are megasuits that 
ambled along for decades, wreaking financial havoc on all but the 
lawyers.1 At the other end of the spectrum are trivial pursuits: football 
fans who sued referees,2 prison inmates who wanted a legal right to 
chunky rather than smooth peanut butter,3 mothers who asked a court 
to resolve a playground shoving match between their three-year-olds,4 
fathers prepared to litigate over their fifteen-year-olds’ positions on 
high school athletic teams,5 a purchaser of Cracker Jacks who 
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 1. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 83–84 (2000) (outlining the litigation tactics meant to exhaust opponents’ 
resources). 
 2. Jerold S. Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER’S, Oct. 1976, at 37, 42. 
 3. THOMAS BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 2 (2002). 
 4. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE LOST ART OF DRAWING THE LINE 14–15 (2001). 
 5. Dave McKibben, Coaches’ Lineup Could Include a Lawyer, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2003, 
at A1. 
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demanded damages for a missing prize,6 and a McDonald’s customer 
who sought $15,000 for damage to his teeth and marital relations 
caused by a defective bagel.7 
Each year in teaching professional ethics, I focus a class session 
on litigiousness and begin with highlights from such cases. I describe 
the facts and results without linking them together. A prize goes to 
any student who correctly matches the claims and outcomes, which 
ranged from a six-figure jury verdict to sanctions for a frivolous claim. 
Almost no students come close. The following are representative 
examples of the disagreement among judges, jurors, and the public 
about what constitutes a frivolous lawsuit: 
• A purchaser of the porn video “Belle of the Ball” sued the 
store in which he bought it on the ground that the featured 
actress graced the screen for only ten of seventy-five minutes. 
Alleged damages included the cost of medication to treat an 
asthma attack “brought on by the stress and strain of being 
‘ripped off.’”8 
• A student who spent eleven fruitless years in search of the 
perfect state of life promised by Maharishi International 
University finally sued the school for fraud. Although the 
university had represented that the plaintiff would learn to 
fly, he had only learned to hop with legs folded in the lotus 
position. And contrary to the school’s claims, chanting in the 
method prescribed did not reverse the aging process or 
enable him to self-levitate.9 
• A restaurant customer, whose steak arrived well done, not 
“medium-well” as requested, voiced dissatisfaction not only 
about the meat but also about other aspects of the meal. 
When adequate remedies were not forthcoming, he called 
the police from his cell phone to get the situation corrected. 
The officer who arrived instead told the customer to pay up 
and get out, or face arrest. The lawsuit that followed sought 
damages from the restaurant owner, the police officer, the 
 
 6. HOWARD, supra note 4, at 15. 
 7. Chris Malcolm, The Case Against a Bagel, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2003, at 27; David 
Grimes, Attack of the Killer Bagels, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Feb. 9, 2003, at E1. 
 8. Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1993). On remand, the trial court 
dismissed the case, and the state supreme court affirmed the dismissal. Osborn v. Emporium 
Videos, 870 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1994). 
 9. See Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council–U.S., 853 F.2d 948, 950–53 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (reversing a jury verdict and award of $137,890 and remanding for a new trial). 
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police department, the chief of police, the town, and the town 
board and its members.10 
• A McDonald’s drive-in customer wedged a chocolate 
milkshake between his legs as he headed back to the road. In 
reaching for french fries on the seat beside him, he 
inadvertently squeezed his legs. When the cold milkshake fell 
into his lap, the startled driver ploughed into the car in front 
of him. The driver of the other car subsequently sued 
McDonald’s for failure to warn its customers of the risks of 
eating and driving.11 
• A student who was fed up when stood up for the high school 
prom sued for the cost of her shoes, hairdo, flowers, and 
court filing fee.12 
• A woman who dried a poodle in her microwave sought 
damages from the manufacturer for failure to warn her of the 
unhappy result.13 
The existence of these cases, and the varying outcomes and 
reactions that they evoke, are emblematic of broader controversies 
about how much blaming and claiming belongs in the justice system.14 
I.  LEGAL HYPOCHONDRIA: ARGUMENT BY ANECDOTE 
Americans are in widespread agreement that the nation has too 
much frivolous litigation but there is also broad disagreement about 
what falls into that category. About four-fifths of the public,15 and 
 
 10. See Schlessinger v. Salimes, 100 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing the claim and 
ordering sanctions against the plaintiff and his attorney for a frivolous appeal). 
 11. See JAMES L. PERCELAY, WHIPLASH! AMERICA’S MOST FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS 54 
(2000) (summarizing the court’s decision to dismiss the suit but to deny McDonald’s claim for 
attorneys’ fees given the plaintiff’s “creative and imaginative” claim). 
 12. See Quotes, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 30, 30 (reporting that the case was settled for 
$81.28, which covered the cost of shoes, hairdo, flowers and court filing fees). 
 13. See Roger C. Cramton, What Do Lawyer Jokes Tell Us About Lawyers and 
Lawyering?, CORNELL L.F., July 1996, at 3, 7 (indicating that the plaintiff recovered damages 
from the manufacturer for her unfortunate loss). 
 14. See RHODE, supra note 1, at 117–31 (describing public perception, media coverage, and 
debates surrounding civil litigation). 
 15. See Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A5 (citing a survey 
finding that 83 percent of Americans think that there are too many lawsuits); David G. Savage, 
A Trial Lawyer on Ticket Has Corporate U.S. Seeing Red, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 13, 2004, at A1 
(citing a poll finding that 80 percent of Americans believe that the nation has too much 
litigation). 
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about four-fifths of surveyed jurors,16 think that too many meritless 
cases are filed. But assessments of merit often differ widely, as is clear 
from the varying results in the cases described above. Another apt 
example is a Texas multiparty product liability case in which five 
juries reached substantially different verdicts after hearing the same 
facts.17 Inconsistencies also show up in judicial determinations of 
which cases are sufficiently frivolous to warrant sanctions. One 
representative study asked nearly three hundred federal judges to 
consider one of ten hypothetical claims based on reported decisions.18 
In six of the cases, the judges divided almost evenly on whether to 
award sanctions.19 
Complaints about frivolous litigation, and disputes about how to 
define and control it, are by no means a recent phenomenon. For over 
three centuries, Americans have fulminated against the bar as “cursed 
hungry Caterpillars”20 and plagues of “locusts”21 tormenting the 
nation with epidemics of unwarranted litigation and “sapping the 
vitality” from the free enterprise system.22 The basis for this diagnosis 
is largely anecdotal. It draws heavily on what commentators label 
“news as vaudeville”:23 the aberrant, amusing “tort tales”24 like those 
noted above. 
Such cases receive disproportionate attention, and for obvious 
reasons. In an increasingly competitive media market, the line 
 
 16. See Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 515 
(2000) (discussing a 1996 report finding that more than 80 percent of jurors “believed that there 
were too many frivolous lawsuits”). 
 17. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 127 
(2001). 
 18. SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 11–15 (1985). 
 19. Id. at 17. 
 20. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (2d ed. 1985). 
 21. Auerbach, supra note 2, at 37. 
 22. Terry Carter, A Lesson Learned, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 70, 70 (quoting Thomas J. 
Donahue, President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also Archie W. Dunham, 
Speech at the National Press Club (Oct. 28, 2002) (critiquing the tort system for “drain[ing] 
billions of dollars from our productive capacity”), available at 
http://www.conocophillips.com/news/speeches/102802_npc.asp (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 23. Deborah L. Rhode, A Bad Press on Bad Lawyers, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL 
POLICY, AND THE LAW 139, 147 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999). 
 24. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, 
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 5–6 (2004). The text accompanying notes 24–40, infra, tracks the 
analysis in RHODE, supra note 1, at 120–21, and DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 26–
27 (2004). 
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between news and entertainment increasingly blurs. Loony litigation 
plays to popular prejudice and offers a diverting alternative to dreary 
statistical details about the potential plaintiffs priced out of the justice 
process. As a result, the public gets anecdotal glimpses of atypical 
cases without a sense of their overall significance. A content analysis 
of one widely publicized book, The Litigation Explosion, tallied up its 
“evidence”: 272 short anecdotes, 1 case study, and 6 citations to 
statistical surveys.25 Many of the statistical data were highly 
misleading.26 
The problem is compounded by political polemics and business-
sponsored media campaigns that take considerable poetic license. In 
the 1992 presidential debates, then-President George H.W. Bush 
maintained that Americans were “suing each other too much and 
caring for each other too little.”27 His son continued the theme a 
decade later in calling for tort reforms to curb “junk lawsuits” and the 
“litigation culture.”28 Without apparent irony, a president who owed 
his election to a lawsuit has lamented, “We’re a litigious society; 
everybody is suing, it seems like. There are too many lawsuits in 
America . . . .”29 Their effect, according to President George W. Bush, 
is to “terrorize small business owners” and drive doctors out of 
practice.30 And, he pointed out, “[N]o one has ever been healed by a 
frivolous lawsuit.”31 
Since 2001, the United States Chamber of Commerce alone has 
spent over $100 million on television commercials and related 
 
 25. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 67 (discussing WALTER OLSEN, THE 
LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1992)). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 46–90. 
 27. BURKE, supra note 3, at 171 (quoting President George H.W. Bush). 
 28. Nick Anderson & Edwin Chen, Bush Pushes Stance Against “Junk Lawsuits,” L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A20 (quoting President George W. Bush); see Stephen Labaton, Bush’s 
Calls for Tort Overhaul Face Action in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A12 (quoting 
President George W. Bush about the need “to protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits”); 
Warren Vieth, Bush Hammers Medical Malpractice Suits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A17 
(quoting President George W. Bush’s demand for national action against “junk lawsuits”); 
President George W. Bush, Address at the University of Scranton, Penn. (Jan. 16, 2003), 
available at 2003 WL 125455; see also Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
President Calls for Medical Liability Reform, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/01/print20030116.html (Jan. 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(summarizing President Bush’s remarks). 
 29. Bush, supra note 28. 
 30. RHODE, supra note 1, at 121 (quoting George W. Bush, then-Texas governor). 
 31. David Hechler, At ATLA, “We Are at War,” NAT’L L.J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A1 (quoting 
President George W. Bush). 
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strategies.32 The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) 
coordinates public relations and lobbying efforts by over three 
hundred well-financed corporate and trade groups, along with thirty 
state reform organizations.33 Advertising campaigns sponsored by 
business and insurance interests offer variations on the same theme. 
Some campaigns feature public parks and recreational facilities shut 
down because of liability concerns; other television ads show vaccines 
withdrawn from the market and pregnant women unable to find 
maternity care. A bumper sticker accompanying one campaign reads: 
“Go Ahead. Hit Me (I Need the Money).”34 The demons in these 
morality plays are, of course, “fat cat” trial attorneys who are “living 
in the ‘lap of luxury’ at the expense of taxpayers and consumers.”35 
The Manhattan Institute’s report, Trial Lawyers, Inc., and the 
associated website chronicle the costs of excessive claims.36 Citizens 
against Lawsuit Abuse, which has local organizations in about a half 
dozen states, also has a website featuring “loony lawsuits” and 
strategies for curbing them.37 Books sell widely with titles like The 
Case against Lawyers38 and The Rule of Lawyers: How the New 
Litigation Elite Threatens America’s Rule of Law.39 Their message is 
simple: attorneys are “making out like bandits,” while bankrupting 
businesses, clogging the courts, and pricing insurance out of reach for 
millions of consumers.40 
The bar responds in kind. The Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America (ATLA) and its sister state organizations periodically launch 
major advertising efforts to educate voters and juries about the “true” 
 
 32. Shailagh Murray, Trial-Lawyers Lobby Discovers Unlikely Friends: Republicans, WALL 
ST. J., July 8, 2004, at A1. 
 33. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 43. 
 34. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People’s 
Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 470 (2000). 
 35. Rhode, supra note 23, at 150. 
 36. The Manhattan Institute, Trial Lawyers Inc.com, at http://www.triallawyersinc.com. 
 37. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 45. 
 38. CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS (2002). 
 39. WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE 
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW (2003). 
 40. See CRIER, supra note 38, at 187 (noting the monetary costs and drain on judicial 
resources caused by “ridiculous suits”); AAHP Launches New Television Ad Campaign, PR 
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 25, 1999 (“Laws that make trial lawyers rich by drowning the courts with new 
lawsuits . . . could cost almost two million Americans their health insurance.”). 
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villains and victims in personal injury litigation.41 In the world that bar 
commercials portray, only attorneys stand between the ordinary 
citizen and the “corporate wolves” at the door: swindlers, polluters, 
and manufacturers of unsafe products.42 Recent public relations 
efforts to halt malpractice reforms feature a disabled child in a 
wheelchair who will never walk again “because of a careless medical 
error.”43 In another advertisement, a woman recounts having both 
breasts removed after a false diagnosis of breast cancer.44 “Who do 
you trust to say what’s fair,” an unseen narrator asks rhetorically, 
“the jury, or corporations and their politicians? Don’t let them put 
profits over people.”45 
In these warring public relations campaigns, truth is a frequent 
casualty. The facts get dumbed down and spruced up to fit self-
interested agendas. “Whatever you do has to fit on a bumper sticker,” 
explains one veteran ATLA lobbyist.46 Such sound bites distort the 
reality that they claim to describe. As one tort expert notes: 
Editorial writers, policy analysts, and legislators typically pick one of 
these competing [accounts], pair it with a few highly salient (and 
invariably unrepresentative) anecdotes, and then offer their 
preferred policy initiative as the solution du jour. . . . 
. . . Those involved in this series of kabuki-like performances 
demonstrate little interest in determining which of these competing 
realities is true . . . . 47 
The result is that reform strategies are proceeding without an 
informed understanding of procedural pathologies, their underlying 
causes, and the complex tradeoffs that solutions will require. 
The first difficulty is that critics’ accounts of legal hypochondria 
prove neither that America has exceptional levels of frivolous claims 
 
 41. See Martin Lasden, On the Air, CAL. LAW., June 2003, at 12, 12 (describing a recent 
ATLA advertising campaign). 
 42. See Rhode, supra note 23, at 151 (recalling one such ad by the Consumer Attorneys of 
California). 
 43. Lasden, supra note 41, at 12. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Murray, supra note 32, at A6 (quoting Linda Lipsen). 
 47. David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know and 
What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1639–40 (2002). 
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nor that they occupy a substantial amount of judicial time.48 Courts in 
many cultures provide outlets for petty grievances and develop 
strategies for sanctioning or summarily dismissing clearly meritless 
cases.49 
Moreover, what qualifies as a frivolous claim generally depends 
on the eye of the beholder. Although some cases, including a number 
of those described earlier, meet almost anyone’s definition, the line 
between vindictiveness and vindication is often difficult to draw. 
Sexual harassment lawsuits were once routinely dismissed as “petty 
slights of the hypersensitive,” beneath judicial notice.50 Yet only 
through these “petty” claims have Americans finally begun to 
recognize the real price of such abuse in turnover, absenteeism, 
psychological damages, unequal opportunities, and lost productivity.51 
Many illustrations of trivial claims and outrageous verdicts also 
rely on misleading factual accounts. A textbook example involves a 
multimillion dollar punitive damages award against McDonald’s for 
serving coffee at a scalding temperature.52 To most Americans, this 
case served as an all-purpose indictment of the legal profession and 
legal process. An avaricious lawyer paraded a petty incident before 
an out-of-control jury and extracted an absurd recovery.53 Politicians, 
pundits, and industry leaders replayed endless variations on the 
theme summarized by the national Chamber of Commerce: “Is it fair 
to get a couple of million dollars from a restaurant just because you 
spilled your hot coffee on yourself?”54 
 
 48. The text accompanying notes 48–72 builds on earlier discussions in RHODE, supra note 
1, at 121–23 and RHODE, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
 49. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know 
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4, 56 (1983). 
 50. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 98 (1997) (quoting trial judge’s 
characterization). 
 51. KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 
TO 1993, 203 (1994). 
 52. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth 
$2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, l994, at A1. For my earlier account of the McDonald’s case, 
see RHODE, supra note 24, at 28–29 and RHODE, supra note 1, at 122. For another, fuller 
treatment, see HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 183–226. 
 53. See Gerlin, supra note 52 (“Public opinion is squarely on the side of McDonald’s. Polls 
have shown a large majority of Americans . . . to be outraged at the verdict.”). 
 54. RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE 
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 267 (1996). The McDonald’s case has figured 
prominently in Congressional debates. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 279. 
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On closer examination, the question no longer looks rhetorical. 
The plaintiff, a 79-year-old woman, suffered acutely painful third-
degree burns from 180-degree coffee.55 She spent eight days in the 
hospital and returned again for skin grafts.56 Only after McDonald’s 
refused to reimburse her medical expenses did she bring suit.57 At 
trial, jurors learned of seven hundred burn cases involving 
McDonald’s coffee during the preceding decade.58 Although medical 
experts had warned that such high temperatures were causing serious 
injuries, the corporation’s safety consultant had viewed the number of 
complaints as “trivial.”59 The jury’s verdict of $2.3 million was not an 
arbitrary choice.60 Its punitive damages award represented two days of 
coffee sales revenues. The judge then reduced the judgment to 
$640,000.61 To avoid an appeal, the plaintiff settled the case for a 
lesser, undisclosed amount.62 McDonald’s put up warning signs and 
other fast-food chains adopted similar measures.63 Although 
evaluations of this final result may vary, it was not the patently 
“ridiculous” travesty that critics described.64 The same is true of the 
approximately two dozen coffee spill cases that have gone to trial in 
the decade following the original verdict. Outcomes for plaintiffs have 
differed, but consumers as a group have benefited from tighter lids 
and other safety innovations.65 
The skewed spin given to the McDonald’s litigation is not an 
isolated case. Examples of litigiousness that are deficient in drama 
sometimes “have drama grafted on.”66 All too often, facts fall by the 
wayside to make a better story, and the public misses what the real 
 
 55. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 268–69. 
 56. Id. at 268. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 269. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 271. 
 61. See id. (noting the basis of the jury award); Cindy Webb, Boiling Mad, BUS. WK., Aug. 
21, 1995, at 32, 32 (noting the reduction of the judgment). 
 62. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 272. 
 63. Webb, supra note 61, at 32. 
 64. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 267 (quoting the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 
characterization of the award as “ridiculous”). But see S. Reed Morgan, Letter to the Editor, 
Verdict Against McDonald’s Is Fully Justified, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A20 (explaining the 
justification for the verdict). 
 65. Matt Fleischer-Black, One Lump or Two, AM. LAW., June 2004, at 15, 15. 
 66. See DAVID L. PALETZ & ROBERT M. ENTMAN, MEDIA, POWER, POLITICS 16 (1981) 
(“Drama is a defining characteristic of news.”). 
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story should be. When unrepresentative anecdotes substitute for 
analysis, they camouflage broader trends.67 Stories are easier to sell 
than statistics, so descriptions of what the ATRA terms “lawsuit 
abuse” are frequently long on folklore and short on facts.68 The 
problem is compounded by cognitive biases. Because vivid incidents 
are consistently repeated and readily recalled, the public tends to 
overestimate how often they occur.69 Drama displaces data, and 
Americans end up with a misdiagnosis of both the problem and the 
prescription. 
A case in point is the perennially popular assertion that the 
United States is experiencing an escalating epidemic of litigation and 
has become “the world’s most litigious nation.”70 Scholars have 
debunked this claim so often that it is startling how much bunk 
survives. Current litigation rates in the United States are not 
exceptionally high, in comparison either with prior eras or with many 
other Western industrial nations not known for contentiousness. 
Americans were more likely to sue a century ago than they are now.71 
United States court filings now are in the same range, when adjusted 
for population, as those in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England, 
and Denmark.72 According to Professor Marc Galanter’s recent study, 
 
 67. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1161 (1992). 
 68. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 135 (noting ATRA criticisms); see also HALTOM & 
MCCANN, supra note 24, at 1–13, 66–67 (describing distorted accounts); Lynn A. Baker & 
Charles Silver, Civil Justice Fact and Fiction, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1537, 1538–42 (2002) 
(documenting misconceptions and false anecdotes); Richard Lacayo, Anecdotes Not Antidotes, 
TIME, Apr. 10, 1995, at 40, 40 (critiquing a commentator’s use of anecdotes); Jonathan Turley, 
Legal Myths: Hardly the Whole Truth, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2005, at 11A (citing fabricated 
accounts). 
 69. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 69, 153; Saks, supra note 67, at 1161. 
 70. John Leo, The World’s Most Litigious Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 
1995, at 24, 24; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 16–17 (characterizing litigation as a 
“national disease”); Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 50 (discussing a perceived “litigation explosion”). The 
discussion of litigation rates in the text accompanying notes 70–90 tracks RHODE, supra note 24, 
at 29–31 and RHODE, supra note 1, at 123–24. 
 71. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1103 
(1996); Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 285, 285–86 (2002). 
 72. RHODE, supra note 1, at 123; Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in 
Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1981–82 
(2002); cf. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1993) (observing that the numbers of lawyers in England, Canada, and 
Germany increased at comparable or higher rates during the last generation). 
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“The Vanishing Trial,” the number of federal and state courtroom 
contests peaked in the mid-1980s and has dramatically declined ever 
since.73 It is true that Americans resort to litigation more often than 
other nations to solve social problems.74 But whether or when this is 
undesirable is far more complicated than critics generally assume. 
The relevant question should be, “Compared to what?” 
In any event, litigation rates are no measure of abusive litigation. 
Uncontested divorces account for much of the recent growth in civil 
caseloads. Yet the higher frequency of marital breakdowns appears 
less a reflection of increased litigiousness than of increased 
expectations for marital satisfaction and decreased tolerance of 
domestic violence.75 Nor do such cases constitute a major drain on 
judicial resources: one representative survey clocked the average 
uncontested divorce hearing at four minutes.76 Although business 
leaders are the sharpest critics of litigiousness, disputes between 
businesses are the largest and fastest growing category of civil cases. 
Tort claims, such as those involving personal injuries and defective 
products, trigger the most criticism but are in fact declining.77 
Improvements in product safety, increased use of alternative dispute 
resolution, and tort reforms that make lawsuits less profitable have all 
played a role in curbing litigation.78 
What are rising, however, are the size of tort awards and 
malpractice premiums, and these increases prompt substantial 
concern. For example, in product liability litigation, the median 
award, not including punitive damages, has tripled over the last 
 
 73. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 459 (2004) (tracing the 
decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trials); Tyler Cunningham, Disappearing Act, 
S.F. DAILY J., June 1, 2004, at A1 (“Although the number of lawsuits filed has generally 
increased over [the past four decades], fewer of them end in the courtroom drama commonly 
thought to be law’s main event.”). 
 74. BURKE, supra note 3, at 4; cf. MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 167 (1997) (noting the rapid increase in rates of case filings in the United States since the 
early 1980s). 
 75. RHODE, supra note 1, at 123. 
 76. Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro 
Se Divorce, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 129 (1976). 
 77. Greg Winter, Jury Awards Soar As Lawsuits Decline on Defective Goods, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2001, at A1. 
 78. Ted Rohrlich, We Aren’t Seeing You in Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A1; see also 
Galanter, supra note 72, at 92–95 (noting the decrease in products liability suits filed). 
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decade.79 Medical malpractice recoveries have grown as well, although 
at more modest rates.80 Malpractice premiums in some regions and 
some specialties also have risen dramatically; in 2002 alone, some 
doctors paid increases between 40 and 112 percent.81 It is, however, 
unlikely that the average increases result from abusive litigation or 
runaway jury verdicts. Indeed, the most commonly cited reasons for 
the growing size of awards are that medical costs have increased at 
about the same rate as recoveries and that plaintiffs’ lawyers are more 
selective in the litigation that they bring; only cases with reasonably 
strong evidence of liability and substantial damages are worth 
litigating.82 Punitive damages, the most common target of critics, are 
awarded in only about 4 percent of cases that plaintiffs win in court,83 
and only about 2 percent of malpractice claims result in victories at 
trial.84 Contrary to common wisdom, juries are no more likely than 
judges to show sympathy for injured victims and to award punitive 
damages.85 
So, too, the average increase in malpractice premiums is not 
exceptional in relation to health care costs and reflects a number of 
factors that bear no relation to the merits of suits filed. First, the 
average increase in doctors’ premiums over the last quarter century 
has been between 11 and 12 percent, which is about the same as 
recent increases in health insurance premiums for individual 
consumers and their employers.86 Moreover, according to most 
commentators, the spikes in costs for physicians in some areas are 
 
 79. Winter, supra note 77. But see Jonathan D. Glater, Study of Size of Jury Awards Finds 
a Flattening Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2005, at C2 (noting that both the total and the median 
of the largest jury awards have declined from 2002 to 2004). 
 80. Peter Eisler et al., Hype Outraces Facts in Malpractice Debate, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 
2003, at 1A. Not all regions show substantial growth. See Bernard Black et al., False Diagnosis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A25 (citing findings that large Texas malpractice awards between 
1988 and 2002, when adjusted for inflation, showed no significant increase). 
 81. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 28. 
 82. See Eisler et al., supra note 80 (“Medical costs are going up . . . and they tend to drive 
up medical malpractice awards . . . .”); Joseph B. Treaster, Malpractice Insurance: No Clear or 
Easy Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at C1 (noting lawyers’ reluctance to take weak cases 
with low award potential); Winter, supra note 77 (“Smaller cases are getting priced out of the 
market . . . .”). 
 83. William Glaberson, A Study’s Verdict: Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A9. 
 84. Eisler et al., supra note 80. 
 85. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002). 
 86. Eisler et al., supra note 80. 
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largely attributable to factors other than litigation: poor investment 
revenues for insurance companies; the loss of a few major providers; 
and the need to compensate for price wars in the 1990s, when greater 
competition kept premiums low.87 How much effect large damage 
awards have on policy costs is subject to debate,88 but most evidence 
suggests that caps on awards are not the best way of controlling 
malpractice policy costs.89 States such as California that have curtailed 
such costs have done so by regulating the insurance industry, not by 
limiting lawsuit recoveries.90 That is not to deny the hardships 
resulting from premium increases, nor to discount other problems in 
the tort system. But it is to suggest that the nature and causes of those 
problems are rather different from what conventional wisdom 
assumes. 
II.  REDEFINING THE PROBLEM:  
INEFFICIENCY, INCONSISTENCY, AND INEQUITY 
Although excessive litigation is the pathology dominating public 
discussion and policy agendas, systematic research reveals that the 
more serious problems are undercompensation of victims and 
overcompensation of lawyers. For example, the most systematic 
research finds that only about 10 percent of accident victims file 
 
 87. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters Fray over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at 
A1; see also Black et al., supra note 80 (citing evidence that the increase in Texas malpractice 
premiums reflects forces outside the tort system); Laura Bradford, Out of Medicine, TIME, Sept. 
16, 2002, at A13, A13 (attributing the rising costs of malpractice insurance to the fact that some 
insurers raised premiums to compensate for decreased investment and others “pulled out of the 
malpractice market completely”); Eisler et al., supra note 80 (suggesting that insurance 
companies raised medical malpractice premiums to compensate for the price wars of the 1990s); 
Jyoti Thottam, He Sets Your Doctor’s Bill, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 50, 50 (“Industry analysts say 
insurers’ investment losses, not just jury awards, are behind the crisis [in medical malpractice 
insurance costs].”). 
 88. For discussion of the relationship between caps and premiums, see Kenneth E. Thorpe, 
The Medical Malpractice “Crisis”: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH 
TRACKING, Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20, W4-25 to W4-27; Eisler et al., supra, note 80; Richard 
Perez-Pena, Few Doctors at Protests on Insurance in New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at 
B5; Treaster, supra note 82. 
 89. Eisler et al., supra note 80. Moreover, it is also unclear that caps on noneconomic 
damages effectively limit the defendants overall liability. Adam Liptak, Go Ahead. Test a 
Lawyer’s Ingenuity. Try to Limit Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at E5 (discussing a study 
of jury verdicts finding that the amounts were roughly comparable in states with and without 
caps). 
 90. See Treaster, supra note 82 (observing that California’s price controls, adopted in 1988, 
had the greatest and most consistent effect on lowering malpractice insurance premiums). 
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claims and only 2 percent bring lawsuits.91 Similarly, a review of some 
thirty thousand New York hospital records discloses that only about 
12 percent of patients who sustained injuries from negligent medical 
care brought malpractice actions and only half of those patients 
received compensation.92 Other research on medical malpractice cases 
finds that plaintiffs on average recover just over half of their costs, 
and those claimants with the most severe injuries end up with only a 
fourth of their costs.93 Similar patterns of undercompensation hold for 
victims of unsafe products or automobile and airline accidents.94 The 
tort liability system reimburses only about 4 percent of victims’ direct 
losses from accidental injuries.95 
Part of the reason for this undercompensation lies in the highly 
expensive adversarial system on which Americans rely to compensate 
most injuries. This nation turns to courts for needs that other 
countries meet through less costly administrative measures and social 
services.96 For example, accident victims in many Western 
industrialized societies can seek assistance from agency-run 
compensation structures, guaranteed health insurance, or no-fault 
wage replacement systems, rather than from personal injury litigation. 
Litigation American style is too expensive for claims involving 
modest economic damages and medical costs. Recent tort reforms 
capping pain and suffering awards have made lawsuits even less 
feasible for the vast majority of injuries.97 Cases worth less than 
$150,000 are typically priced out of the court system.98 
 
 91. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 121–26 (1991); see also PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL 
JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF TORT LAW 58 (1997) (referring to Hensler’s finding, supra, that “a 
very small percentage of injured persons—in the neighborhood of 10 percent—make any kind 
of claim for compensation from an injuring party or his insurer”); Marc Galanter, The 
Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 
663 (2000) (noting a study finding that 10 percent of potential claimants made claims); Saks, 
supra note 67, at 1183–87 (reviewing results of various studies of tort claimants’ behavior). 
 92. HARVARD MED. PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 2, 6 (1990). 
 93. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical 
Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 155 (Winter 1991). 
 94. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 121–28; HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 98. 
 95. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 121–28. 
 96. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 3–4 (discussing “America’s uniquely litigious public policy 
style”); KAGAN, supra note 17, at 135–37 (discussing the Japanese system, which focuses on 
nonlitigious dispute resolution). 
 97. See Jamie Court, Commentary, Damage Cap Adds Insult to Injuries, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2003, at B11 (“[I]nnocent patients who cannot prove large wage loss or medical bills . . . 
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The expense of legal proceedings is not, of course, lost on the 
public. Over four-fifths of surveyed Americans believe that litigation 
is too slow and too costly, and about three-quarters believe that it is 
damaging the country’s economy.99 About half of surveyed corporate 
leaders think that product liability suits have a major impact on their 
companies’ international competitiveness.100 Yet, although concerns 
about expense are eminently justifiable, fears about economic 
productivity are less well grounded. Precise cost assessments are 
lacking, but the most systematic research estimates that tort liability 
could represent no more than 2 percent of the total expense of United 
States goods and services, an amount highly unlikely to have a 
substantial effect on American competitiveness.101 Other estimates 
suggest that businesses’ total liability for all legal claims, including 
torts, is about twenty-five cents for every one hundred dollars in 
revenue.102 Given such modest costs, it is not surprising that corporate 
risk managers have reported relatively little adverse effect from 
liability on larger economic indicators such as gross revenues or 
market share. In managers’ experience, the major impact of tort 
claims has been to improve product safety and warning efforts.103 
A related concern about the expense of litigation is that undue 
risks of liability and excessive insurance premiums cause businesses to 
refrain from distributing valuable products and force doctors to shift 
their practice locations, change their specialties,104 or order 
 
often cannot find attorneys because the economics do not add up for lawyers . . . .”); infra text 
accompanying note 183. 
 98. Court, supra note 97. 
 99. See Karen O’Connor, Civil Justice Reform and Prospects for Change, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 917, 922 (1993) (noting the results of a study on attitudes toward the speed and cost of 
litigation); Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (noting 
poll results on the effect of litigation on the national economy). 
 100. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 147. 
 101. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and 
Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, 128–29 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). 
 102. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 279. 
 103. NATHAN WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 2 (Conf. Bd., 
Rep. No. 893, 1987). 
 104. For reports that excessive premiums are driving doctors in some states out of business, 
causing them to abandon high-risk specialty procedures or forcing them to move states with 
more favorable tort laws, see Daniel Eisenberg & Maggie Sieger, The Doctor Won’t See You 
Now, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 46, 46; Eisler et al., supra note 80; Ten-Gallon Tort Reform, WALL 
ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A10. 
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unnecessary medical tests.105 Critics claim that Americans are guided 
less by the rule of law than by “the fear of law.”106 Here again, some 
concern is warranted but the extent of the problem often is 
overstated. The exodus of doctors appears confined to a few 
geographic areas and a few fields such as obstetrics.107 On average, 
only about 3 percent of doctors’ revenue covers malpractice 
premiums,108 an amount not self-evidently excessive or likely to cause 
major career changes. Most research has not found a systematic 
relationship between insurance premium increases and withdrawals 
from practice.109 Studies of “defensive medicine” suggest that liability 
risks have led to both desirable and excessive precautions.110 Whether 
the costs are justified involves complex value tradeoffs that popular 
debate generally ignores or obscures. A review by the federal 
government’s Office of Technology Assessment concludes that “a 
relatively small proportion of all diagnostic procedures—certainly less 
than 8 percent overall—is performed primarily due to conscious 
concern about malpractice liability risk.”111 Many experts also believe 
that the frequency of unnecessary procedures has been declining still 
further as a result of cost constraints imposed by managed care.112 
Although product withdrawals sometimes have been a major 
problem, as in the case of vaccines for childhood illnesses,113 in other 
instances litigation has reduced major safety risks. Obvious examples 
 
 105. See HOWARD, supra note 4, at 25 (“‘We know we don’t need [X rays],’ one doctor 
admitted, ‘but you have to prove it in court.’” (alteration in original)). 
 106. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Welcome to Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
June 16, 2003, at 64, 64. 
 107. See Eisler et al., supra note 80 (“[D]octors in particularly vulnerable specialties—
obstetrics, neurosurgery and some high-risk surgical fields—face severe problems . . . .”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE 74 (1994) (observing that two studies found no “statistically significant positive 
relationship between liability risk and withdrawal from obstetrics practice”); Eisler et al., supra 
note 80 (“[T]here is little statistical evidence that more than a tiny percentage of doctors 
nationwide are making such decisions [to leave practice because of rising premiums].”). 
 110. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 274 n.28; see also BELL & O’CONNELL, supra note 91, at 92 
(noting both beneficial and “wasteful” effects of defensive medicine); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality 
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 402 
(1994) (“[T]he practice changes induced by the malpractice system include a substantial 
measure of both [appropriate and inappropriate defensive medicine].”). 
 111. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 109, at 74. 
 112. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and 
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1607 (2002). 
 113. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 143 (noting the withdrawal of some childhood vaccine 
manufacturers from the market). 
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include asbestos, flammable pajamas, Dalkon Shields, and products 
causing toxic shock syndrome.114 
Exaggerated portraits of litigation expenses also compound the 
problem that critics describe. Systematic overestimation of liability 
costs encourages unnecessary tests and product removals.115 And 
media coverage that disproportionately focuses on huge damages 
awards encourages such skewed perceptions.116 Cases reported by the 
press have verdicts between four and thirty-four times larger than the 
average.117 Many of these large verdicts are reversed or settled for 
lesser amounts. One study of malpractice cases found that almost half 
were reduced after the verdict.118 Other research on punitive damages 
has found that three-fifths of the jury awards are not fully paid.119 Yet 
because the news needs to be new, exceptional awards attract 
disproportionate coverage. Such awards are easier for reporters to 
identify, because plaintiffs’ lawyers have an obvious interest in 
publicizing large victories rather than humiliating losses or modest 
settlements. Confidentiality agreements also prevent disclosure of 
many final outcomes.120 Moreover, cases involving exceptional 
recoveries or frivolous claims often are especially memorable.121 The 
combined effect of selective reporting and selective recall leads to 
misperceptions of the likelihood of large recoveries, particularly in 
tort contexts.122 Even relatively well-informed individuals—including 
 
 114. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 315–17 (listing cases in which tort liability led to 
significant safety improvements, including in tampons and flammable pajamas); Schwartz, supra 
note 110, at 406 (discussing the Dalkon Shield). 
 115. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 17, at 142–43 (citing examples of unnecessary deterrence). 
 116. Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE 
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61, 85 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 117. Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as 
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
419, 426 (1996); see also HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 166, 167 tbl.4 (“[M]ore than 
nine out of ten reported settlements and about seven out of ten reported awards surpass [the 
estimated medians of settlement and award amounts].”). 
 118. Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 30, 2004, at A1 (referring to a study by Professor Neil Vidmar). 
 119. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 99. 
 120. Id. at 129–31. 
 121. See William Glaberson, The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee: When the Verdict Is Just a 
Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at D1 (“Unusual or big verdicts make news . . . .”). 
 122. For discussion of the psychological tendency of individuals to overestimate the 
frequency of a given type of occurrence based on their recall of examples of that occurrence, 
regardless of its actual statistical likelihood, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 
208 (1973); see also HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 24, at 153 (“Newspapers report the 
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lawyers, legislators, and insurance adjusters—have highly inflated 
perceptions of both the frequency of litigation and the size and 
likelihood of plaintiffs’ verdicts.123 
Research on the litigation system reveals significant problems 
but they are not the ones highlighted in popular debate and policy 
agendas. The most well-documented concerns involve inefficiency 
and inconsistency.124 Litigation is an extremely expensive way to 
compensate victims. Plaintiffs’ attorneys collect an estimated $30 
billion annually in legal fees125—money that could otherwise help 
prevent or compensate injuries. In cases of automobile accidents, 
almost 50 percent of the payments by insurance companies end up in 
the hands of lawyers for both sides rather than in the pockets of 
victims.126 In other tort cases, the transaction costs are even higher, 
averaging close to 60 percent.127 And in mass tort litigation involving 
asbestos, two-thirds of insurance expenditures have gone to lawyers 
and experts.128 Such costs are not inevitable. Other countries do better 
by relying more heavily on official investigations and nonlitigious 
dispute resolution procedures to resolve accident claims.129 In Japan, 
for example, experts estimate that legal fees consume only about 2 
percent of compensation payments.130 Few victims find it necessary 
even to hire lawyers.131 The Netherlands’ no-fault system for 
 
spinning of tort reformers and, having thereby made tort tales widely available, cite that very 
availability as evidence of frequency.”). 
 123. Galanter, supra note 116, at 85–86; see also Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South 
Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 
S.C. L. REV. 585, 594–98 (1988) (describing a study finding that doctors, lawyers, and legislators 
significantly overestimated trends in civil litigation and jury awards); Glaberson, supra note 121 
(describing policymakers’ reliance on exaggerated impressions of the tort system). 
 124. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 126–27 (commenting on the inefficiency and 
inconsistency of American asbestos litigation). 
 125. Pamela Sherrid, Lawyers on Trial, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 34, 34. 
 126. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION 29 (1987) (finding 
that plaintiffs in automobile-related cases received 52 percent of total payouts); see also Charles 
Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2099–100 (2002) (discussing 
the Hensler study’s findings, supra). 
 127. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 126, at 29 (finding that plaintiffs in non-automobile-
related cases received 43 percent of total payouts). 
 128. See id. (finding that plaintiffs in asbestos-related cases received 37 percent of total 
payouts). 
 129. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 136–37 (describing Japanese procedures). 
 130. Id. at 137; Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident 
Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 651, 663–64 (1990). 
 131. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 137 (citing data showing that fewer than 2 percent of 
Japanese accident victims hire lawyers). 
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reimbursing asbestos victims similarly manages to avoid the excessive 
transaction costs of American litigation.132 These systems may, of 
course, create other problems of undercompensation.133 But as noted 
above, undercompensation is also common in the American justice 
system, which prices out modest claims entirely and imposes excessive 
transaction costs on the ones that remain.134 
The problems are compounded in class action cases in which the 
real parties in interest are the lawyers. In some cases, class members’ 
injuries are de minimis, but the costs of trial are sufficient to lead to 
settlements that provide generous counsel fees for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and little or no compensation for clients.135 Defendants find 
such settlements particularly inviting if the remedy can be structured 
so that most plaintiffs will not claim the damages to which they are 
theoretically entitled. The most notorious example is the coupon 
settlement, in which prevailing parties receive a discount against 
future purchases of the defendants’ products.136 Often, the amounts 
are too trivial to justify efforts to collect them. In one all too typical 
case, only two of 96,754 coupons were ever redeemed, a rate of .002 
percent.137 In other cases involving big-ticket items like cars or trucks, 
few plaintiffs are likely to make another purchase within the 
redemption period.138 Because attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties 
are generally based on the damages officially awarded, not those 
actually redeemed, lawyers may be well compensated by coupon 
settlements that are little more than sales promotions for defendants’ 
products.139 
Such strategies received the treatment that they deserved in 
columnist Dave Barry’s account of the “Adhesive Denture 
 
 132. See id. at 126–27 (comparing the relative costs of the Dutch and American systems). 
 133. See id. at 126 (describing compensation under the Dutch system as “modest”). 
 134. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 194 (discussing transaction costs); KAGAN, supra note 17, 
at 126–27 (discussing undercompensation in the asbestos context); supra text accompanying 
note 98.  
 135. See CRIER, supra note 38, at 194 (observing that, in a settlement of a suit against 
Blockbuster Video, “[c]lass members [got] a free rental, but the attorneys rake[d] in a bundle”). 
 136. See Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class 
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 473 (1996) (describing coupon 
settlement procedures). 
 137. CRIER, supra note 38, at 194. 
 138. Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 136, at 502. 
 139. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 195 (quoting the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit’s rejection of the GM coupon settlement as “arguably . . . a GM sales promotion 
device”). 
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Menace.”140 This national peril arose after a manufacturer recalled 
certain adhesives containing traces of benzene, a potential 
carcinogen.141 Without evidence of any actual injuries, vigilant 
attorneys brought suit on behalf of purchasers unaware of their 
“victimhood.”142 The settlement gave several hundred known buyers 
seven dollars and gave some 2,800 undocumented buyers the 
opportunity to fill out forms and receive a package of discount 
coupons.143 Lawyers’ fees and expenses totaled almost $1 million.144 As 
Barry acknowledges, this may seem like “[a] lot of money . . . [but i]t 
cannot be easy, taking a case wherein it appears, to the naked 
untrained layperson eye, that nobody has suffered any observable 
harm, and, using legal skills, turning it into a financial transaction that 
involves thousands of people and a million dollars! Plus coupons!”145 
However, the value of these cases cannot be measured solely in 
economic terms. Their function is also deterrence. Class actions serve 
to discourage misconduct when none of the injured parties suffers 
large enough individual damages to justify legal challenge. Generous 
awards in successful cases also help compensate attorneys for cases 
that are unsuccessful. The same is true of tort litigation more 
generally. Some plaintiffs’ lawyers incur large risks in subsidizing 
lawsuits that serve crucial public interests.146 Often, an entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ bar has ensured accountability for hazardous products, 
fraudulent practices, discriminatory conduct, and other violations of 
legal rights. Litigation has stepped in where politicians and 
government regulators have feared to tread, and Americans have a 
safer and more just society as a consequence. Moreover, many 
plaintiffs’ attorneys do not earn excessive returns for bringing such 
actions. Outside the large metropolitan areas where high-stakes 
litigation centers, the average earnings of contingent fee attorneys 
 
 140. Dave Barry, Lawyers Put the Bite on Denture-Adhesive Maker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Nov. 23, 1993, at E1. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. The most obvious recent example is the tobacco cases. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra 
note 24, at 258–59. For discussion of excessive claims by tobacco lawyers, see Alex Beam, Greed 
on Trial, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2004, at 96. 
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may not be significantly greater than those of counsel who bill 
hourly.147 
Yet, although the problem of excessive fees is frequently 
overstated, it clearly needs addressing. In too many cases, windfall 
recoveries for lawyers far exceed reasonable returns, or the incentives 
necessary to bring socially useful lawsuits.148 The cost of such 
excessive fees does not fall only on businesses with deep pockets. The 
result may be an increase in prices for consumers or a reduction in the 
funds available for compensating seriously injured plaintiffs. The 
American Lawyer magazine had it right in a story about one class 
action attorney who represented some eighty thousand clients with 
the same basic claims for leaky plumbing.149 Despite the relatively 
minimal work required, he sought over $100 million in fees and 
expenses, totaling about two-thirds of the class settlement fund.150 The 
story’s headline came to the point: “Greedy, Greedy, Greedy.”151 
Not only is the American adversary system excessively 
expensive, it is also inaccurate and inconsistent.152 The most 
systematic studies of medical malpractice cases have found that most 
victims of substandard care did not file claims or recover any 
compensation, but that more than 80 percent of those who did bring 
suit did not receive deficient care.153 Almost half of these medical 
 
 147. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 302 (1998) (summarizing study results indicating that 
contingency-fee practice produces “at best ‘somewhat’ better” returns for lawyers, especially in 
light of the time and effort required to screen cases and the inability of most contingency-fee 
lawyers to “tap into” high-profit cases routinely). But see Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly 
Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 653, 686, 734 (2003) (arguing that contingent-fee lawyers have far higher effective hourly 
rates in tort litigation); Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort 
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 69 (2003) (“[A] top tier consisting 
of approximately 25 to 30 percent of the torts bar is able to obtain effective rates of return of 
thousand of dollars an hour; when these fees are obtained in cases where the lawyer has 
undertaken no meaningful risk, they are properly referred to as windfall fees.”). 
 148. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENT FEES 20–23 (1994); Brickman, 
The Market for Contingent-Fee Financed Tort Litigation, supra note 147; see Beam, supra note 
146, at 96–98, 105–108. 
 149. Alison Frankel, Greedy, Greedy, Greedy, AM. LAW., Nov. 1996, at 71, 71. 
 150. Id. at 72. 
 151. Id. at 71. 
 152. See Joseph Sanders, Adversarial Legalism and Civil Litigation: Prospects for Change, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 719 (2003) (reviewing KAGAN, supra note 17) (outlining the “costliness” 
and “legal uncertainty” of the American system of “adversarial legalism”). 
 153. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140; Peter Huber, Easy Lawsuits Make Bad Medicine, 
FORBES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 166, 166. 
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malpractice plaintiffs nonetheless recovered damages because the 
expenses of trial and risks of a large verdict made modest settlements 
an attractive alternative for insurers.154 Other research on personal 
injury claims reveals high levels of fraud, which is estimated to cost 
insurance companies between $80 billion and $120 billion annually.155 
In the tort cases that go to trial, results are often idiosyncratic 
and poorly related to the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries and defendants’ 
culpability.156 What matters more is which side has the most effective 
lawyers, whether the case is filed in a “plaintiff-friendly” region,157 and 
whether defendants appear to have deep pockets.158 For example, in 
one study of two decades of Chicago jury awards, plaintiffs who fell in 
buildings owned by corporations recovered significantly higher 
damages than plaintiffs who fell on government property, and three 
times as much as plaintiffs who fell in private residences.159 In mass 
tort cases, much depends on when the party’s injury is discovered and 
how quickly the claim proceeds. Many asbestos victims with serious 
injuries will recover less than victims with minor claims because, by 
the time those injuries develop, most defendants will be bankrupt and 
their assets largely exhausted.160 Other factors also contribute to the 
 
 154. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140 (observing that expense and uncertainty in litigation 
often pressure insurers to settle); Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1619 (noting that sixteen 
of thirty-seven surveyed claims were paid even though none of the claims was found to have 
involved negligence). 
 155. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 146 (citing studies of high fraud rates); Silver, supra note 
126, at 2076 (citing figures of insurance loss from fraud). 
 156. See BURKE, supra note 3; KAGAN, supra note 17, at 138–42; Daphne Eviatar, Is 
Litigation a Blight, or Built In?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at B7 (paraphrasing Professor 
Thomas F. Burke’s view that “the system is far from equitable or predictable”). 
 157. See OLSON, supra note 39, at 209–36 (using various examples to describe the Deep 
South as the “Jackpot Belt”); Jim Copland, The Tort Tax, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A16 
(discussing the phenomenon of “magnet courts” or “magic jurisdictions” for class action suits); 
Adam Liptak, Playing the Angles in Class-Action Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at C11 
(reporting on a class action suit against Intel filed in Madison County, Illinois, the county with 
the most class action filings per capita nationwide); Ten-Gallon Tort Reform, supra note 104 
(praising tort reform legislation in Texas and noting that the state had previously been described 
as a “judicial hellhole[] . . . correctly perceived as [a] very plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction[]”). 
 158. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2105 (1998) (“[E]quivalent outrage and punitive intent 
will produce significantly higher dollar awards against wealthy defendants.”). 
 159. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 140. 
 160. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Anchem and 
Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1924 (2002) (“[T]he very sickest must give up some of the 
compensation that might otherwise be theirs in order to satisfy the least sick (and their lawyers). 
Moreover, those who discover that they are seriously injured some years hence may find very 
little money left on the table.”); Adam Liptak, Shot in the Arm for Tort Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, 
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inconsistency in treatment of similar cases, such as the vagueness of 
criteria for determining pain and suffering awards and punitive 
damages, and jurors’ lack of information or experience concerning 
the recoveries for similar claims in other cases.161 Many studies find a 
poor correlation between juries’ and experts’ evaluations of the same 
claims. Although, as noted earlier, most serious injuries are 
undercompensated, a few plaintiffs hit the jackpot. Awards like the 
$28 billion verdict for a single smoker in a tobacco case add a level of 
uncertainty that works against rational settlement behavior and 
consistent outcomes.162 
Defenders of the tort system, typically the lawyers who are its 
most frequent beneficiaries, claim that any inefficiencies are 
outweighed by the deterrence functions that a fault-based system 
ensures. Yet as experts readily acknowledge, there is little systematic 
evidence about how much deterrence such a system adds to 
regulatory controls, and whether the marginal deterrence is worth its 
price.163 Most research suggests that the deterrent effect of tort cases is 
muted by liability insurance and by the delays, inconsistencies, and 
inaccuracies of litigation.164 For example, studies of medical 
malpractice find that the chance that a physician’s negligent error will 
lead to compensation is under 5 percent.165 And because doctors’ 
malpractice premiums generally do not reflect their personal records, 
the economic sanctions imposed by current liability structures are 
often indirect and ineffectual.166 Physicians already have strong 
personal and professional reasons to avoid negligent practices, and it 
is not clear that an expensive fault-based compensation system adds 
 
Nov. 17, 2002, at C1 (noting the “finite sums of money available” to compensate asbestos 
claimants). 
 161. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 138. 
 162. John M. Broder, California Jury Allots Damages of $28 Billion to Ill Smoker, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A14. An appellate court reduced the judgment to $28 million. Myron 
Levin, Judge Slashes Huge Award in Smoking Case; Record $28-Billion Verdict by a Los Angeles 
Jury to a Lung Cancer Sufferer is Trimmed to $28 Million, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, § 3 at 1.  
 163. See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 444 (“[F]or most sectors of tort law the pertinent data 
bearing on safety benefits and defendant compliance costs are now and are likely to remain 
unavailable. For this and other reasons, most sectors of tort law cannot be subjected to anything 
resembling a full cost-benefit review.”). 
 164. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 141–44 (surveying research on the uncertain deterrent 
effect of tort liability). 
 165. Mello & Brennan, supra note 112, at 1618. 
 166. See id. at 1621 (“[M]alpractice insurance premiums are rarely experience rated. 
Thus, . . . health care providers do not feel the full economic consequences of their mistakes.”). 
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any crucial measure of deterrence.167 Other research on tort litigation 
finds that the threat of lawsuits exerts a significant but vague 
influence on individual and organizational behavior.168 As experts 
note, “Because the linkage between good design and a firm’s liability 
exposure remains tenuous, the signal says only: ‘Be careful, or you 
will be sued.’ Unfortunately, it does not say how to be careful, or, 
more important, how careful to be.”169 
Moreover, the strengths of the American legal structure in 
compensating for political inaction carry countervailing costs. Many 
problems that land in courts by default could be addressed more 
effectively by legislative or regulatory action. Particularly in cases 
involving major societal interests or mass torts, delegating 
decisionmaking to the least accountable branch of government raises 
as many problems as it resolves.170 The tobacco litigation is a stunning 
example of the inordinate health and legal costs that have resulted 
from political paralysis. At last count, trial lawyers were set to pocket 
more than $75 billion over the next quarter-century; some of these 
lawyers netted fees amounting to $150,000 per hour.171 Much of that 
money could have gone for prevention and treatment if the 
government had acted earlier. 
In short, America’s heavy reliance on litigation, particularly in 
personal injury contexts, comes at a substantial price, although the 
major problems are not the ones that dominate public debate. 
American rates of litigation are neither as exceptional nor as great a 
drain on productivity as critics often suggest. But the system for 
compensating victims is inefficient, inconsistent, and inequitable. 
Plaintiffs with serious injuries are undercompensated, similar cases do 
not receive similar treatment, defendants draw murky or misleading 
messages about the risks of liability, and the costs of dispute 
resolution are excessive. These are not new concerns. To understand 
their persistence, Americans need a more informed picture of the 
 
 167. See KAGAN, supra note 17, at 141 (“The precautions taken by physicians . . . are 
motivated primarily by professional ethics.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. George Eads & Peter Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to 
Product Liability Law and Regulation, 7 J. PROD. LIAB. 263, 290 (1984). 
 170. See Robert J. Samuelson, Delegating Democracy, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 59, 59 
(suggesting that issues such as tobacco regulation and gun control should be resolved through 
popular debate and legislation rather than through “[g]overnment by litigation”). 
 171. Marcia Coyle, Bill Targets Class Action Lawyer Fees: Sparked by Ire over Tobacco 
Money, NAT’L L.J., May 19, 2003, at 1. 
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underlying causes of the problems and the complexities of crafting 
solutions. 
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obtained large damages awards with no legal expenses.174 Similar 
coalitions are now challenging other industries, such as gun and lead 
paint manufacturers.175 
A full evaluation of alternative structures and potential reform 
strategies is beyond the scope of this essay. But to put the debate over 
access to justice in perspective, it makes sense at least to suggest 
better ways of thinking about litigation-related problems and 
appropriate policy responses. To this end, reform efforts should first 
focus on core principles. What are the major goals of the justice 
system, and how should the nation measure its effectiveness in 
achieving them? 
A broad range of scholarly and popular commentary speaks to 
both of these questions and generates an equally broad range of 
views. But there is consensus on several main points. The primary 
objectives of a civil litigation system should be to resolve disputes, 
compensate victims, and deter violations of legal standards. Key 
criteria for assessing the performance of the system include its costs in 
time, money, and acrimony, and its procedural and substantive 
fairness. The substantive standard is, of course, the most difficult to 
apply. Part of the problem in developing a reform agenda is the lack 
of consensus on what constitutes reasonable outcomes, particularly in 
personal injury cases. But some measure of agreement seems likely 
on certain core values. One is consistency; similar cases should yield 
similar results. A second is the opportunity to be heard and to obtain 
some measure of individualized treatment. These are, to some extent, 
competing values. Individualized opportunities are costly and 
increase the likelihood of inconsistent results. But only by explicitly 
addressing the tradeoffs are we likely to obtain reform strategies that 
respond to Americans’ highest aspirations and most critical concerns. 
Common reform proposals take three main forms. One approach 
is to discourage litigation by making recovery more difficult for both 
plaintiffs and their attorneys. A second strategy is to focus on better 
management of legal claims. Examples include greater use of 
sanctions for frivolous cases and alternative forms of dispute 
resolution. A final option is to reduce the need for litigation by 
creating other compensation systems or by minimizing the problems 
that give rise to legal disputes.176 
 
 174. Sherrid, supra note 125, at 34. 
 175. OLSON, supra note 39, at 108; Sherrid, supra note 125, at 34. 
 176. See BURKE, supra note 3, at 27. 
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The modern tort reform movement has relied primarily on the 
first approach. Beginning in the 1970s, an alliance of businesses, 
professional associations, insurance companies, and a few nonprofit 
and governmental organizations began a major campaign to limit 
“litigation abuse.”177 A second wave of reform occurred in the mid-
1980s and another took place in the late 1990s. A renewed push 
emerged after the Republican election victories in 2000.178 Each effort 
brought modest success, primarily in terms of state legislation179 and 
education of judges and juries about the implications of large awards 
for taxpayers and consumers.180 The main legislative reforms have 
involved placing limits on punitive and noneconomic damages such as 
pain and suffering, creating panels to screen medical malpractice 
cases, restricting lawyers’ contingent fees, limiting venue to prevent 
parties from shopping for “plaintiff-friendly” jurisdictions, and 
altering the substantive tort law on matters such as the availability of 
damages from “collateral” sources or from joint defendants whose 
codefendants are insolvent. In the most recent campaign, additional 
objectives have included federal legislation to cap pain and suffering 
awards and to restrict class actions.181 Attention also has focused on 
more fundamental changes, such as loser-pays proposals that would 
make unsuccessful litigants liable for their opponents’ legal fees.182 
Some of these reforms create as many problems as they solve. As 
noted earlier, the vast majority of tort victims are undercompensated, 
not overcompensated. Only a small minority file successful claims and 
the individuals most seriously injured receive the least adequate 
recoveries. Limiting damages compounds these injustices. Such 
limitations strike hardest at those with the most severe disabilities and 
 
 177. See id. at 29. 
 178. See text accompanying note 181 infra. 
 179. Rebeca Rodriguez, Tort Reform Narrowly Approved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Sept. 14, 2003, at 1A. 
 180. BURKE, supra note 3, at 32. 
 181. For an overview, see generally Stephanie Francis Ward & Siobhan Morrissey, Tort 
Reform Gaining Traction, Coupons, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 5, 2004, WL 3 No. 44 
ABAJEREP 1. See also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); Leonard 
Post, Tort Reform: Fate of 2004 Class Actions with a New Act: A Mixed Bag, NAT’L L. J. Feb. 21, 
2005, at A1; David Rogers & Monica Langley, Bush Set to Sign Landmark Bill on Class Actions, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at A1 (“Future civil actions will be subject to a new, more 
federalized framework that would remove cases from state courts if the aggregate claims are 
more than $5 million.”). 
 182. RHODE, supra note 1, at 129; see also CRIER, supra note 38, at 211 (arguing that “loser 
pays all costs would be the biggest single change to improve our civil court system today”). 
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at vulnerable individuals such as low-wage workers, full-time 
homemakers, or children, whose economic losses are too modest to 
justify litigation.183 Similar injustices arise with reforms that would 
require most punitive damages to be paid to the state, rather than to 
lawyers and injured parties.184 Moreover, the impact of such 
limitations on insurance costs is modest. A Congressional Budget 
Office study estimated that a national cap of $250,000 would reduce 
consumers’ health insurance premiums by less than 1 percent.185 
According to one medical association estimate, the effect of similar 
New Jersey legislation would be to lower doctors’ premiums by only 
about 5 to 7 percent.186 If, as these associations claim, America is truly 
facing a malpractice crisis, these responses are scarcely adequate. 
Requiring unsuccessful litigants to pay their adversaries’ legal 
fees might reduce frivolous claims but at the cost of discouraging 
meritorious ones as well. The parties most likely to suffer would not 
be corporations, which can absorb additional legal costs as tax-
deductible business expenses. The real losers would be people of 
moderate means with strong but uncertain claims who could not risk 
subsidizing both sides of an unsuccessful suit. Supporters of fee-
shifting initiatives seldom discuss this problem.187 Instead, they 
 
 183. Damage caps would also deter lawyers from taking cases that do not impair 
employment, such as that of a woman who had both breasts removed because of an erroneous 
lab report diagnosis of cancer. See Bob Herbert, Malpractice Myths, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, 
at A23. There is also evidence that lawyers may be unwilling to accept cases with low economic 
damages under systems that cap non-economic damages. See id.; Court, supra note 97; Rachel 
Zimmerman & Joseph Hallinan, As Malpractice Caps Spread, Lawyers Turn Away Some Cases, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; Rhonda L. Rundle, Effect of Malpractice Caps is Tallied, WALL 
ST. J., July 13, 2004, at D4. 
 184. For a proposal by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that would give the 
state 75 percent of punitive damage recoveries, see Adam Liptak, Schwarzenegger Sees Money 
for State in Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at A12; David Wessel, California 
Looks for Cash in the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2004, at A2. For the disincentives to 
litigate claims involving punitive damages under such damage-sharing formulas, see Walter 
Olsen, More Punitives to the People, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at A14. 
 185. Eisler et al., supra note 80. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Robert Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism?: A Preliminary Inquiry, 
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 11 (1994) (describing Americans’ “mistrust [of] concentrated power, 
care about individual rights, and [belief] in private ordering” as leading to the development of 
legal rules, such as the rejection of a loser-pays dynamic, that encourage access to courts); see 
also Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); Common Sense Legal Reforms 
Act, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995); Glaberson, supra note 83; Glaberson supra note 121. 
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emphasize that loser-pays systems are the norm in other nations.188 
But these countries typically have more comprehensive legal 
assistance, social welfare, and health insurance programs than does 
the United States. Such programs reduce reliance on privately 
financed litigation to subsidize the costs of injuries, which also 
reduces the chilling effects of fee liability. American advocates of fee-
shifting policies are also diplomatically silent about Florida’s 
unsuccessful experience. After five years, the state abolished its loser-
pays system in medical malpractice cases. Although the threat of 
additional legal fees did somewhat reduce the number of malpractice 
cases filed, it also increased the number that went to trial. Plaintiffs 
fought harder because the stakes were higher. And because a 
significant number of losing plaintiffs had insufficient assets to pay 
opponents’ costs, defendants’ overall expenses were also higher.189 
Whether comparable results could be avoided under more carefully 
designed systems is a complex question on which experts disagree. 
But supporters of fee shifting have made little effort to educate 
policymakers or the public about the complicated and uncertain 
tradeoffs that their proposal would entail.190 
The second type of reform proposals, which attempts to improve 
management of legal disputes, holds more promise but often suffers 
from the same limitations as discussions of litigiousness. The public 
gets too much sweeping rhetoric and too little careful factual analysis. 
Critics of the current system frequently present alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) as an all-purpose prescription. It becomes the 
preferred solution for excessive expense, delay, and combativeness. 
Critics of ADR offer similarly sweeping assessments. In their analysis, 
 
 188. Werner Pfenningstorf & Donald G. Gifford, Introduction to A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED 
STATES (Donald G. Gifford & William M. Richman eds. 1991). 
 189. See James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement under the English 
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J. L. & ECON. 225, 248 (1995) (noting evidence 
from Florida suggesting adverse effects on procedural efficiency and deterrence under the loser-
pays rule); Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: 
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 345, 576–78 (1990) (summarizing evidence 
from Florida finding a greater likelihood of trials under loser-pay rules); infra note 190. 
 190. Attorney Accountability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Congress 49–66 (1995) (statement of 
Professor Herbert M. Kritzer); id. at 42–47 (statement of Professor Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.). 
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ADR offers “apartheid justice”—a strategy for bypassing, rather than 
addressing, inadequacies in the current structure.191 
To make sense of this debate, the public needs fewer categorical 
pronouncements and more contextual evaluation. The last two 
decades have witnessed a dramatic growth in the range and 
sophistication of ADR methods, such as arbitration, mediation, and 
adjudication by privately retained judges. Some recent tort reform 
proposals would build on this experience by creating specialized 
tribunals to hear malpractice or product liability cases. Current ADR 
methods vary considerably in structure and offer different strengths 
and limitations. Not all respond effectively to concerns about 
litigiousness. Public debate too often relies on over- simplified or 
idealized models. ADR advocates tend to compare a courtroom trial, 
with all its costs, to a more informal, participatory process, with all its 
virtues. From this perspective, adversarial proceedings look far less 
attractive than alternatives that can assist parties to identify 
underlying interests, explore possibilities for mutual gains, and 
discover strategies that may prevent or resolve future disputes.192 
Yet as ADR critics note, 85 to 95 percent of civil cases never get 
to trial193 and many ADR processes are no less costly or contentious 
than traditional adjudication.194 For example, proceedings before 
privately selected arbiters, judges, or jury panels rely on conventional 
adversarial frameworks. Opportunities for delay and obfuscation are 
comparable to those plaguing current litigation processes.195 
Imbalances of wealth, power, and information may skew outcomes 
 
 191. NADER & SMITH, supra note 54, at 299–300; Robert Gnaizda, Secret Justice for the 
Privileged Few, 66 JUDICATURE 6, 11 (1982); see Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: 
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence 
of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although 
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.”). 
 192. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, In Search of “Good” Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice 
and Empiricism, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 231 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee 
Hamilton eds., 2000) (exploring the “effects of implementing different mediation paradigms for 
resolving civil legal disputes.”). 
 193. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of 
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994). 
 194. See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 58 
(describing costs in time, money, and contentiousness). 
 195. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 177 (1988); Reuben, supra note 194, at 58; see Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 553 (1986) (noting that some 
“problems associated with judge-sponsored settlements arise within the ADR context as well”). 
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under any dispute resolution system, including ones that rely on 
nonadversarial approaches.196 Research comparing mediation and 
adjudication does not find consistent differences in costs, speed, or 
participant satisfaction.197 
Rather, this research underscores the importance of context both 
in structuring and evaluating dispute resolution processes. Problems 
are most likely to surface in arbitration, mediation, and screening 
processes that are mandatory rather than voluntary, or that fail to 
address major disparities in power and resources. For example, 
compulsory workplace arbitration systems that involve employers 
who are repeat players often systematically disadvantage employees 
who are not.198 In one study involving such systems, the odds of an 
employer victory were about 5 to 1.199 Only repeat players had 
incentives to investigate the records of ostensibly “neutral” 
decisionmakers to identify possible biases.200 Even when parties are 
more evenly matched, ADR is not always a desirable substitute for 
adjudication. Processes designed to satisfy private parties lack public 
accountability and may undervalue public interests.201 ADR methods 
do not require appointed or elected officials to enforce norms that are 
subject to democratic or judicial oversight.202 Informal procedures 
aimed at private settlements may provide insufficient development of 
legal precedents or inadequate deterrence of unlawful conduct.203 
 
 196. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1391 (“ADR is no safe haven for the 
poor and powerless.”). 
 197. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY 
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT: A SUMMARY 4–7 (1996). 
For mixed results, see the studies cited in Reuben, supra note 194, at 56–59, and Deborah R. 
Hensler, Puzzling Over ADR: Drawing Meaning from the RAND Report, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Summer 1997, at 8, 9. 
 198. Reuben, supra note 194, at 61. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at 
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 297, 346 (1996) (“Although privatized ADR has the advantage of removing certain 
disputes or even whole classes of disputes from the admittedly crowded judicial system, it holds 
substantial potential for unfairness at least so long as judicial review of private arbitration 
remains highly deferential.” (footnote omitted)). 
 202. See Fiss, supra note 191, at 1085 (arguing that the judiciary cannot give force to the 
public values reflected in statutes and constitutions when disputes are resolved without trial). 
 203. LIND & TYLER, supra note 195, at 122; Fiss, supra note 191, at 1085; David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995). 
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Yet the issue in evaluating legal processes should always be, 
“Compared to what?” Critics who denounce ADR as second-class 
justice need to consider how often first-class is available, and on what 
terms. The deficiencies common in ADR are also chronic in 
conventional adjudication. Private settlements are the norm, not the 
exception, and procedural protections that are available in theory are 
often unavailable in practice. Imbalances of wealth, power, and 
information skew outcomes even in cases receiving the closest judicial 
oversight. As the title of Professor Marc Galanter’s now-classic article 
put it, the “‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” in most legal settings.204 
If any single lesson emerges from the burgeoning research on 
dispute resolution, it is that no single method is uniformly superior. 
Yet the current legal process is heavily weighted in favor of a single 
adversarial structure, which does not always serve the interests of 
either participants or the public. What the nation needs instead is a 
broader range of procedural choices and the information necessary to 
make them; more innovation and evaluation should be priorities. 
Proposals along these lines are not in short supply. Many ADR 
experts have developed promising blueprints for “multidoor 
courthouses” that would “fit the forum to the fuss.”205 These 
courthouses would allocate different types of cases to appropriate 
dispute resolution processes based on several basic criteria: the nature 
of the controversy, the novelty or complexity of the relevant law, the 
relationship between the parties, the priorities that the participants 
attach to various features of the dispute resolution process, and the 
societal interests at issue.206 Cases involving relatively small monetary 
damages and the application of settled legal precedents may not 
justify the expense of full-scale adjudication. In other contexts, the 
relationship between the parties may argue for procedures that are 
best able to address power disparities or to foster long-term working 
relationships. Specialized tribunals may be appropriate when subject-
matter expertise and experience are critical to ensuring reasonable 
 
 204. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 95 (1974). 
 205. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 67 (1994); see Frank 
E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the National Conference on 
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 
F.R.D. 111, 118–26 (1976) (outlining several criteria for dispute resolution). 
 206. Sander, supra note 205. 
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and consistent treatment of similar cases.207 Development of special 
substantive rules, such as an adequate standardized formula for pain 
and suffering damages, could assist such tribunals in reaching more 
uniform awards that would not penalize low-income victims.208 
A related, but more fundamental, reform strategy would be to 
replace the litigation/ADR structure with a more streamlined no-fault 
compensation system. Many other countries have successfully 
implemented such systems in areas such as personal injury, 
discrimination, and administrative benefits.209 These processes often 
make lawyers unnecessary and provide effective remedies with 
minimal transaction costs. The United States has adopted similar 
systems in a few contexts, such as workplace accidents and the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.210 Some private institutions have also 
attempted to preempt litigation by creating their own no-fault 
reimbursement funds. For example, a small but growing number of 
hospitals and insurance companies have an “honesty policy” under 
which they inform patients of mistakes and provide compensation for 
lost wages and medical expenses.211 Experience to date suggests that 
these policies are highly cost-effective.212 Many experts have 
advocated analogous specialized tribunals and streamlined no-fault 
compensation structures for “adverse medical events.”213 Such systems 
could offer a number of advantages over malpractice litigation: more 
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timely remedies, coverage for a broader group of victims, and lower 
transaction costs. 
Whether no-fault frameworks would provide adequate 
deterrence of negligent conduct in other personal injury contexts has 
provoked considerable debate. Much would depend on the details of 
the systems and surrounding legal culture. However, in the case of 
medical malpractice, some evidence suggests that no-fault 
frameworks could result in more frequent reporting of errors and give 
providers greater incentives to reduce all preventable injuries, not just 
the injuries demonstrably linked to negligence.214 For a health care 
system that now causes somewhere between forty-four thousand and 
ninety-eight thousand avoidable patient deaths annually, this would 
be a significant benefit.215 
A rational reform agenda would provide more experimentation 
with no-fault frameworks, specialized tribunals, and other ADR 
approaches, as well as more systematic information about their 
effectiveness. How well do different models serve societal goals 
concerning efficiency, deterrence, fairness, cost, and accessibility? 
Granting the risks of superficial cross-cultural comparisons, what can 
reformers learn from other countries’ approaches to similar legal 
problems? Although more adequate data are necessary, the research 
available suggests that expanding procedural options is a move in the 
right direction.216 Parties’ satisfaction with the legal process is heavily 
dependent on assessments of its procedural fairness; opportunities for 
direct participation, not mediated through lawyers, can increase 
perceptions of fairness.217 Most individuals prefer to handle legal 
grievances in informal, out-of-court settings and to have more control 
over the process than is possible in litigation.218 Expanding ADR also 
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introduces a measure of beneficial competition. If individuals have 
choices, they have greater leverage in making their needs heard and 
in enhancing the quality of the options available. 
A final cluster of reform strategies should focus on the 
misconduct that breeds excessive litigation and related abuses. For 
example, more effective disciplinary processes for doctors and 
lawyers could help address the roots of the problem. Some research 
suggests that, over the last decade, 5 percent of physicians have been 
responsible for one-third of malpractice awards and settlements. It 
does not, of course, follow that these doctors are responsible for a 
similarly disproportionate share of the vast number of medical errors 
that never result in claims. Nor are many of these errors the products 
of individual negligence. But a system that more effectively weeded 
out practitioners with a history of incompetence would produce 
substantial savings in lives and dollars. Further progress could come 
from building more incentives for quality control into malpractice 
insurance rates and health care regulation. Avoidable errors could be 
reduced through improvements in prevention and oversight 
structures.219 
Courts, bar associations, and legislatures could also do more to 
curb excessive legal fees and frivolous cases. Closer judicial scrutiny 
and more stringent contingent fee standards could help limit lawyers’ 
charges to a reasonable return for work performed and risk 
assumed.220 Greater efforts should focus on preventing suits with little 
merit from remaining financially advantageous for counsel. Courts 
could, for example, require that percentage fees in class actions be 
based on the damages that class members actually receive, rather than 
on the theoretical value of unredeemed coupons.221 Another strategy, 
reflected in some state statutes and proposed legislation, would be to 
provide more limits on the percentage formula that lawyers can 
charge, based primarily on how far the case progresses and how time-
consuming preparation becomes. Under such a system, in a matter 
settled without filing suit, lawyers could collect only 25 percent of the 
recovery. In a case settled after filing, their share could not exceed 
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one-third, and in a case that went to trial, lawyers could collect 40 
percent.222 Reasonable fee ceilings or taxes on excessive fees could be 
appropriate in contexts involving huge windfall recoveries, such as the 
tobacco litigation.223 Disciplinary agencies could also impose 
significant sanctions on attorneys who repeatedly filed meritless suits 
or charged extortionate fees. In California’s first such effort, the bar 
sought suspension of three attorneys who held small businesses 
hostage for payoff settlements in unfair competition cases.224 It should 
not, however, have taken some three thousand claims, with boiler 
plate pleadings and no investigation of the underlying facts, to trigger 
disciplinary action.225 
CONCLUSION 
The greatest difficulty in developing an effective litigation reform 
agenda is political, not conceptual. Innovative ideas and promising 
models are readily available. But what the country does lack is an 
informed public committed to addressing the justice system’s most 
fundamental problems and the forces that perpetuate them. Policy 
debates have been hijacked by skewed information and special 
interests. Lawyers seeking maximum fees, businesses seeking 
maximum profits, and physicians seeking minimum liability have 
invested vast efforts in pushing their own agendas. Few of the reform 
proposals that seem remotely plausible are likely to produce the 
result that most Americans want: a dispute resolution system that is 
efficient, equitable, and affordable. Significant progress is unlikely 
until more disinterested players enter the arena and give the public a 
better understanding of the most serious problems and plausible 
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prescriptions. H.L. Mencken was right that “what ails the truth is that 
it is mainly uncomfortable and often dull.”226 The litigiousness debate 
is no exception. Frivolous cases make entertaining reading but a 
misleading blueprint for reform. 
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